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IN THE Ul AI I COI J R I OF 4PPE : \ I -S 
STAIEOF UTAH, : 
PlaintiffAppellee, : 
v. : 
JON DONALD HAMLING, : Case No. 2D000XI \ (\\ 
Defendant/y Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The state claims that the docket in this case shows that Defendant/Appellant Jon 
Donald Hamling ("Appellant" or "Hamling") "was subsequently apprehended and booked 
on October 11, 2000, i nore tl iai 11 w o moi iths after sentencing " State' s brief at 5, referring 
to Docket,, I hird District Court Case No. 0019099844. The Docket actually shows only 
that the "Clerk was advised the defendant is in Utah County Jail" on October 11, 2000, 
and that the clerk faxed a copy of the Judgment to both the Salt Lake County and Utah 
County jails on that day. See page 5 of Docket in \,(lciei icii in i to state's brief, ' The 1 )< icket 
does not show w lien < >i \\h\ I litiuiiiiii was booked into the Utah County Jail. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The state argues that the issue of whether a defendant voluntarily absented himself 
from sentencing is a question of fact which is reviewed for clear error. State* *»rv ;. 2, 
7, n. 2. The state's position disregards State v. Anderson, 929 1' 'M 1 iu7, i iU6 ^Uiau 
1996), where the Supreme Court clarified that this issue involves a question of law which 
is reviewed for correctness. The Supreme Court stated: 
This appeal involves only questions of law which we review for 
correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991). "Controlling 
Utah case law teaches that 'correctness' means the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
determination of law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1108. The Court then reviewed the issue of whether Anderson 
voluntarily waived his right to presence as a question of law, pointing out in part that 
ff[a]ny waiver of the right to be present 'must be voluntary and involve an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right."1 Id. at 1110 (citation omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
At sentencing, without affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak, the trial 
judge noted for the record defense counsel's objection to sentencing Hamling in absentia. 
R. 64:2. The trial judge stated, f,For the record, I will, notwithstanding, I'm sure, your 
objection, Ms. Sisneros, mdfor the record, I'll note your objection, proceed with 
sentencing at this time." R. 64:2 (emphasis added). Where a trial judge notes an 
objection for the record then rules on the issue, fairness and practical considerations 
require that the issue be considered preserved for appellate purposes. Given the trial 
judge's statement, defense counsel was not in a position nor required to further outline 
her objections. Because the trial judge noted defendant's objection and ruled on the issue, 
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the issues raised in this case were properly preserved for appeal. 
Additionally, defense counsel alerted the judge to the constitutional and rule 
violations which would occur if he were to sentence Hamling in absentia. The judge 
ruled on the issue. This adequately preserved Hamling's arguments on appeal, all of 
which relate to the due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 violations which occurred in this 
case. 
Moreover, defense counsel filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, pointing 
out that the sentence violated due process and Article I, section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. R. 41-42. This further preserved Hamling's legal claim raised in this case 
that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to presence at sentencing. 
Finally, even if the judge had not noted the objection for the record, this case 
involves a sentence which was imposed in an illegal manner. Pursuant to Rule 22(e), 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court can review this issue even if it is raised for 
the first time on appeal. See State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995). While 
Hamling raised this issue below and the state's claim that the issue was not preserved 
must therefore be rejected, judicial economy and the mandates of Rule 22(e) would 
require that this issue be reviewed even if it had not been preserved. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The state incorrectly relies on docket entries which were made in the trial court 
after the case was on appeal and which are not a part of the record before this Court. 
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There is no subsequently developed evidence before this Court since there has not been 
an additional hearing where information was presented to the judge. In the cases upon 
which the state relies, the subsequently developed evidence was presented to the judge in 
a motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment. Docket entries do not have the same 
reliability as evidence presented to a judge. Additionally, while the docket entries show 
that Hamling was in jail, they do not reflect the totality of the circumstances, including 
when or why he was booked or any reasons for the absence at sentencing. 
The trial court's failure to weigh Hamling's interest in being present for sentencing 
against the public interest in proceeding also requires that the sentence be vacated in this 
case where Hamling's interest in being presence outweighed any state interest in 
proceeding. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
SENTENCING HAMLING IN ABSENTIA. 
A. THE POST-RULING DOCKET ENTRIES DO NOT ESTABLISH 
THAT HAMLING KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO PRESENCE AT SENTENCING. 
The state argues that this Court can consider post-ruling docket entries in 
determining whether Hamling's absence at sentencing was voluntary. State's brief at 9. 
The state argues further that this Court can conclude1 that Hamling's absence was 
1
 As set forth under the standard of review section of this reply brief, the issue of 
whether Hamling knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to presence involves a 
voluntary because the docket entries show he has not contacted the trial judge since the 
sentencing hearing and explained his absence. State's brief at 9-10. The state's argument 
ignores the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right as well as practical and 
ethical considerations, and misreads the cases on which it relies for this proposition. 
The state's claim fails because "evidence" has not been developed after the trial 
court's initial ruling. After the trial judge denied the motion to correct illegal sentence on 
August 30, 2000, hearing has not been held in this case and no "evidence" has been 
presented to the trial court. Instead, a clerk has merely made an entry in the docket, 
which is not part of the record before this Court, showing that Hamling is in jail. The 
docket entries do not reflect the totality of circumstances relating to Hamling's absence. 
Nor are they of the same character or reliability as a minute entry or recorded hearing in 
which a judge participates and the clerk, court reporter or videotape records the events. 
While the docket entries do reflect that Hamling was in Utah County Jail on October 11, 
2000, and booked in the Salt Lake County Jail on October 16, 2000, they fail to provide 
any other information such as when or why he was booked and, as such, do not reflect the 
totality of the circumstances and should not be considered by this Court. 
Additionally, the post-sentencing information was not considered by the trial judge 
in making his voluntariness determination. Because the judge has not considered the 
information, it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider it. 
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. See Anderson, 929 P.2d P.2d at 1110. 
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The state's reliance on State v. Wagstaff. 772 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah App. 1989) and 
Moore v. State. 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) for the 
proposition that this Court may consider docket entries made subsequent to the 
voluntariness ruling is also misplaced. See State's brief at 9. Unlike the present case 
where the clerk made docket entries after the final judgment, in both Wagstaff and 
Moore, the subsequently developed evidence was part of the record because the defendant 
filed a motion for new trial or motion to arrest judgment. These cases, therefore, do not 
support the state's proposition that this Court may consider incomplete docket entries 
which have never been presented to the trial court for review in determining whether the 
trial judge correctly concluded that Hamling was voluntarily absent. 
For example, in Wagstaff. the evidence subsequently developed was made a part 
of the record prior to sentencing when the defendant asked the judge to arrest judgment 
on his conviction following a trial in absentia. IdL at 988-89. In other words, although the 
trial judge ruled prior to trial that the absence was voluntary and allowed the trial to 
proceed in absentia, he again ruled that the absence was voluntary when the defendant 
moved to arrest judgment. While Wagstaff does allow this Court to consider information 
subsequently placed in the record where the trial judge also considered that information 
when reconsidering his prior ruling, it does not, as the state suggests, allow this Court to 
consider docket entries made after the case is on appeal. 
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In Moore, the defendant made a motion for new trial after he was tried in absentia. 
The appellate court indicated that in reviewing the issue of whether the trial court 
correctly concluded that the defendant's absence was voluntary, it was appropriate to 
consider evidence that was developed after the initial ruling. Moore, 670 S.W.2d at 261. 
Because "appellant offered no evidence at his motion for new trial to indicate that his 
absence was anything other than voluntary," the court upheld the trial judge's conclusion 
that the absence was voluntary. 
The state argues further that the docket entry is subsequently developed evidence 
which should be considered by this Court because "[t]o exclude post-ruling evidence 
would make it difficult for a defendant to show involuntary absence when moving to 
correct an illegal sentence." State's brief at 9. Contrary to this assertion, if a defendant 
moved in the trial court to correct an illegal sentence, a hearing would be held and the 
parties would have the opportunity to present relevant evidence. 
The state's argument that because the docket entries do not reflect an effort by 
Hamling to contact the trial court and explain his absence, this Court should conclude that 
the absence was voluntary (State's brief at 9-10) also fails because it incorrectly assumes 
that the docket entries are an accurate record of all activity regarding the case.2 The 
2
 The state also argues that defense counsel's failure to give an explanation for the 
absence as part of the motion to correct an illegal sentence shows that the absence was 
voluntary. State's brief at 9-10. The motion to correct an illegal sentence was made 
shortly after sentencing, before Hamling was being held at the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defense counsel therefore was not in a position to proffer an explanation. 
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docket is simply a summary made by the clerk. A lawyer could contact a judge or the 
judge's clerk and request a sentencing review so that defendant could explain his absence 
or otherwise ask for mercy, and such actions would not be reflected in the docket. If the 
trial judge refused to review the sentence, the docket would not show any effort by the 
defendant to explain his absence. 
Additionally, the state's argument suggests that a defendant who is represented by 
counsel should contact the court on his own, in an ex parte manner, to let the court know 
why he was not present at sentencing. The appropriate forum for offering an explanation 
for an absence would be in a scheduled review with both counsel present. When a review 
has not been held, penalizing the defendant for not contacting the court with an 
explanation would be inappropriate.3 
Furthermore, the state's argument that because Hamling had notice and was not 
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail, he had ,fthe burden of going forward to present 
some 'sound reason' for his absence" after he was incarcerated (State's brief at 10-11) 
fails because it disregards the presumption against waiver of a constitutional right. Courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of a constitutional right. See State 
v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,917 (Utah 1998) (citing inter alia Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 
458, 462-63 (1938)). Rather than honoring this presumption against waiver, the state asks 
3
 Furthermore, some defendants are illiterate or have great difficulty expressing 
themselves; not contacting the trial court from jail does not establish that an explanation 
for the absence does not exist under these circumstances. 
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this Court to presume that a defendant's absence was voluntary where the post-sentencing 
docket does not show an "effort to contact the court to explain his absence." State's brief 
at 9. Requiring a defendant to contact the court after being sentenced in absentia and 
explain the absence creates a presumption that the absence was voluntary if the defendant 
does not make such contact; such a presumption in favor of waiver is contrary to 
constitutional requirements. 
Anderson and Wagstaff do state that "'[i]f [defendant's absence is deliberate 
without a sound reason, the trial may start in his absence.'" Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 
(quoting Wagstaff 772 P.2d at 990) (emphasis added). They do not, however, create a 
presumption that the absence was deliberate and voluntary, nor support the state's claim 
that if the post-ruling docket does not show a reason for the absence, the absence must 
have been voluntary. Instead, Anderson and Wagstaff merely indicate that if a defendant 
deliberately fails to appear at trial, the trial may proceed without him unless he offers an 
explanation. 
B. THE PUBLIC INTEREST DID NOT REQUIRE THAT HAMLING BE 
SENTENCED IN ABSENTIA. 
As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 14-17, in determining whether a 
constitutional or rule violation occurred in sentencing a defendant in absentia, courts must 
weigh the public interest in proceeding without the defendant against the defendant's 
interest in being present. In this case where the public interest in proceeding did not 
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outweigh Hamling's interest in being present, the trial judge erred in sentencing Hamling 
in absentia. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Jon Donald Hamling respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand his case for a new sentencing. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / / i t day of June, 2001. 
Qfeui <i, aw 
JOAN C. WATT 
NISA J. SISNEROS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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